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Non-Specificity and Theory of Mind: New Evidence From a Non-Verbal False Sign 
Task and Children With Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
Abstract 
Understanding of false belief has long been considered to be a crucial aspect of 
theory of mind that can be explained by a domain-specific mechanism. We argue 
against this claim using new evidence from a non-verbal false representation task 
(false-sign task) with typically developing children and children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Experiments 1 and 2 showed that typically developing 
children (mean age = 62.67 months) were equivalent in their performance across 
non-verbal and verbal forms of both the false-belief and false-sign tasks. Results for 
these two misrepresentation tasks differed from the results of an outdated 
representation task (³false´ photograph task). Experiment 3 showed that children 
with ASD had difficulties with the false representation tasks and this could not be 
explained by executive functioning or language impairments. These findings support 
the view that children with ASD may not have a specific theory of mind deficit. 
 
Keywords: Representational understanding; Theory of mind; False sign; Language; 
Executive function; Autism Spectrum Disorders 
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 Non-Specificity and Theory of Mind: New Evidence From a Non-Verbal False 
Sign Task and Children With Autism Spectrum Disorders 
 
It has long been claimed that there is a domain-specific cognitive mechanism 
which supports mental-related processing such as understanding of false beliefs (e.g., 
Baron-Cohen, 1995; Leslie, Friedman & German, 2004). In contrast to this claim, 
the domain-general hypothesis proposes a general conceptual development that 
accounts for both mental and non-mental processing as children come to understand 
false beliefs as representations of the world (e.g., Perner, 1991; Wellman, 1990). 
Others have argued that more general executive or language processing may explain 
children¶s false-belief performance (e.g., de Villiers, 2000; Russell, 1999). To date, 
the debate between domain-specificity and domain-generality of false-belief 
understanding is still ongoing (e.g., Cohen & German, 2010; Iao, Leekam, Perner, & 
McConachie, 2011). More importantly, false-belief performance continues to remain 
one of the key cognitive discriminators of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD; e.g., 
Begeer, Bernstein, van Wijhe, Scheeren, & Koot, 2012). While there is still a 
common assumption, even currently (e.g., Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009; 
Senju et al., 2010), that µmentalising¶ or µtheory of mind¶ is the main problem in 
ASD, there are also suggestions that the problem for individuals with ASD may lie 
in executive and language processing (e.g., Pellicano, 2010; Paynter & Peterson, 
2010). The current study critically tests these accounts regarding ASD and speaks to 
the long-standing debate concerning false-belief understanding. 
Until recently, the debate has been tested empirically by comparing 
false-belief (FB) tasks (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983) with non-mental tasks that 
share similar structural features, e.g., ³IDOVH´ photograph (FP) task (Apperly, Samson, 
Chiavarino, Bickerton, & Humphreys, 2007; Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & 
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Thaiss, 1992; Zaitchik, 1990). The FB task itself involves a protagonist observing an 
object being placed in location A and subsequently moved to location B in the 
SURWDJRQLVW¶VDEVHQFH. Children are then asked where the protagonist thinks the 
object is. In the FP task, the experimenter takes a photograph of an object in location 
A with a Polaroid camera, but then the object is moved to location B. Children are 
asked where the object is in the photograph.  
While the FP and FB tasks appear to show structural similarity and equivalent 
performance in typically developing children, children with ASD failed the FB task 
but passed the FP task (Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; see also 
Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1992). These results furthered Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and 
Frith¶V (1985) original proposal of DµWKHRU\RIPLQG¶GHILFLW in individuals with ASD, 
attributing specific difficulties to the processing of mental-related information, and 
offered evidence against the domain-general hypothesis. However, some researchers 
argued that these tasks present different conceptual demands. This is because a 
photograph is a true representation of the situation at the time the photograph was 
taken, whereas a false belief is a misrepresentation of whatever it is supposed to 
represent (e.g., Leekam & Perner, 1991). Thus, the FP task may not be an 
appropriate non-mental comparison to the FB task and whether individuals with 
ASD have a specific deficit in processing mental-related information needs further 
investigation.  
In order to adequately test the domain-specificity debate, the false-sign (FS) 
task was subsequently devised to replace the FP task (Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & 
Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005; see also Parkin, 1994, for an unpublished thesis). The logic 
behind this is that a sign, like a belief, represents what it is supposed to. In the FS 
task, children are shown a signpost that shows an object in location A but then the 
object is moved to location B. The signpost hence becomes a false sign. Children are 
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asked where the signpost shows that the object is. It has been proposed that the FS 
task, relative to the FP task, is more comparable to the FB task in both behavioural 
studies with children (Leekam, Perner, Healey, & Sewell, 2008; Sabbagh, Moses, & 
Shiverick, 2006) and brain imaging studies with adults (Aichhorn et al., 2009; 
Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006). Training studies with 
children have also demonstrated that the FS and FB tasks are potentially transferable 
(Iao et al., 2011) whereas the FP and FB tasks are not (Slaughter, 1998). Further, 
children with ASD showed similar and associated performance on the FB and FS 
tasks (Bowler et al., 2005). These findings suggest that the FB and FS tasks share a 
developmental factor which is not shared by the FP task and that the suggestion that 
individuals with ASD are specifically impaired in mental-related processing may not 
be valid.  
Yet while conceptual understanding of false representations might explain the 
correspondence between performance on the FB and FS tasks, it could be argued 
that the relation between them might be better explained by a third variable, notably 
other cognitive skills such as executive function or language demands. In terms of 
the inhibitory aspect of executive control, for example, these tasks involve several 
requirements. There is a requirement to disengage from knowledge about the salient 
reality and attend to the representation in question (cognitive inhibition) and to 
inhibit a prepotent response of pointing to the true location of the object (response 
inhibition). In terms of working memory there is also a requirement to maintain and 
process information in mind simultaneously. Indeed, based on the correlations found 
between performance on an executive function task (i.e., the bear/dragon task) and 
the FB/FS tasks but not the FP tasks, Sabbagh et al. (2006) suggested that the FP 
task may pose lesser executive demands than the FB and FS tasks. Furthermore, the 
FB and FS tasks are also linguistically demanding. Children have to comprehend a 
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test question which involves syntactically complex structures (e.g., ³Where does she 
think that X is?´; ³Where does the sign show that X is?´). Such constructions within 
theory-of-mind tasks have been noted to create a challenge for young children (e.g., 
de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000). In contrast, the test question for the FP task, while 
also complex (³Where is ;LQWKHSLFWXUH"´LVsimpler. It is therefore possible that 
these skills in general cognitive processing explain the association between the FB 
and FS tasks.  
Individuals with ASD are widely documented to have abnormalities in 
executive function (e.g., Robinson, Goddard, & Dritschel, 2009) and language (e.g., 
Charman, Drew, Baird, & Baird, 2003). Recent research indicates that false-belief 
performance in ASD may be predicted by executive function (Pellicano, 2010) and 
syntactic language skills (Paynter & Peterson, 2010). It is thus possible that the 
consistently poor performance of children with ASD on the FB and FS tasks reflects 
their impairments in executive function and language. $OWKRXJK%RZOHUHWDO¶V
(2005) finding was based on comparisons with two control groups which matched 
the ASD group on verbal mental age, it was measured by independent vocabulary 
tests which did not measure the exact incidental cognitive demands of the tasks. It is 
thus possible that the ASD and control groups were different in terms of their ability 
in meeting the incidental cognitive demands of the tasks. Robinson et al. (2009) also 
indicated that the impairments in executive function of children with ASD are 
independent of verbal and general intellectual abilities. Matching on verbal mental 
age and/or general intellectual ability does not control for the possible differences in 
executive function between the ASD and control groups. Therefore, it is crucial to 
investigate whether children with ASD have difficulties in understanding both 
mental and non-mental representations, independent of their deficits in language and 
executive function.  
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The main aim of the current study was to establish whether the association 
between understanding of mental and non-mental representations found in both 
typically developing children and children with ASD are best explained in terms of 
an underlying conceptual capacity or in terms of executive functioning and linguistic 
demands. We investigated this issue by employing established tasks and also 
devising a novel false representation task that disentangled the demands of executive 
function and language from representational understanding. The first task we 
employed was the FB task of Apperly, Samson, Chiavarino, and Humphreys (2004; 
adapted from a FB task originally devised by Call & Tomasello, 1999). This task 
was mainly non-verbal and reality-unknown, meaning that the real location of an 
object was not known by participants and therefore the requirement of cognitive 
inhibition was greatly reduced. In the task, a man hid an object in one of two boxes. 
A woman saw where he hid it while participants could not. For the test trial, the 
woman then left the room and the man swapped the boxes around, creating a false 
belief in the woman. When she returned, she briefly placed a marker on the box to 
indicate the location that she thought contained the object. Participants thus had to 
take her false belief into account to correctly find the object.  
Another task we employed was the corresponding non-verbal reality-unknown 
FP task devised by Apperly et al. (2007). It followed the FB task above very closely 
except that the woman took a Polaroid photograph of the interior of the boxes (one 
contained an object), placed the photograph face-down in front of and mid-way 
between the boxes, and left without returning. The man swapped the boxes around 
and briefly showed participants the photograph which was a clue for them to find the 
object. According to Apperly et al., both of their FB and FP tasks made the same 
conceptual demand of representational understanding in the sense that both tasks 
required participants to consider a representation (belief or photograph) in relation to 
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a current situation so as to figure out an object¶s current location. However, it is 
important to note that the photograph waV³of´DQRXWGDWHGVLWXDWLRQ. In other words, 
the photograph acted as a clue, providing outdated information for participants to 
infer the current situation. In contrast, in Apperly et al.¶s FB task, thHZRPDQ¶VIDOVH
belief waV³DERXW´WKHFXUUHnt situation. Her indication with the marker acted as a 
clue providing current but false information for participants to infer the current 
situation. Thus, Apperly et al.¶s FP and FB tasks might still not be equivalent to each 
other. 
 The current study further devised a novel false non-mental representation task. 
This was a non-verbal reality-unknown FS task. In this task, a signpost was 
constructed with an electric plug attached. As a signpost, especially an electrically 
operated signpost, similar to traffic lights, is supposed to represent a current 
situation, it can become false when the electricity supply is disrupted and the 
situation changes. For example, an electrical signpost would UHSUHVHQWDQREMHFW¶V
location as A by automatically turning its direction to point to A. However, if the 
electricity supply is disrupted, it cannot change its direction even though the object 
KDVEHHQPRYHGWR%VRLWNHHSVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHREMHFW¶VORFDWLRQDV$In this way, 
thHIDOVHVLJQSRVWPDWFKHVZLWKWKHZRPDQ¶VLQGLFDWLRQLQ$SSHUO\HWDO¶V(2004) FB 
task, both of which act as clues providing current but false information for 
participants to infer the current situations. However, the signpost is non-mentally 
(electricall\RSHUDWHGZKHUHDVWKHZRPDQ¶VLQGLFDWLRQLQ$SSHUO\HWDO¶V)%WDVNLV
mentally generated. 
The FS task involved initial phases in which participants learned how a 
signpost worked with its electric plug connected to an electricity supply to indicate 
an object¶s location. They also noticed that the signpost could be blocked from view 
by a screen and the object was hid in one of two boxes. The task then followed in 
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steps (see Figure 1). A woman put the signpost¶s plug into a socket and then placed 
the two boxes on each side of the screen. A mechanical noise was heard (meaning 
the signpost was turning behind screen). It is important to note that the mechanical 
noise itself did not indicate direction, only the pointing of the signpost served this 
function. The signpost was then deprived of its electricity supply by the woman 
removing the plug, and it became a false sign when she swapped the boxes around. 
She helped participants to find the object by briefly taking away the screen to show 
the signpost. Participants thus had to take the false sign into account in order to find 
the object. Appendix A shows the key stages of the test trials of these non-verbal 
reality-unknown FB, FP, and FS tasks. Appendix B presents the analogy between the 
components involved in the FB and FS tasks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Event sequence of the test trial of the novel false sign task. 
 
False sign test trial. (1) Signpost was blocked from view by a screen but its 
electric plug was visible. (2) Woman connected signpost¶s plug to electricity 
supply. (3) Woman placed two boxes (one contained object) on each side of 
screen and mechanical noise was heard (meaning signpost was turning). (4) 
Woman disconnected signpost from electricity supply and swapped boxes so 
signpost became false. (5) Woman displayed signpost. (6) Signpost was 
EORFNHGE\VFUHHQDJDLQDQGSDUWLFLSDQWZDVDVNHGWRLGHQWLI\REMHFW¶VORFDWLRQ 
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With this newly devised FS task, the current series of experiments 
re-examined the non-specificity claim of theory of mind. The overall question was 
whether the equivalence between tasks testing mental and non-mental 
representations might be explained in terms of equivalence in representational 
understanding or in terms of other incidental cognitive demands of language and 
executive function. Experiment 1 first tested the new FS task against $SSHUO\HWDO¶V
(2004, 2007) FB and FP tasks in a group of typically developing children. In this 
experiment, the tasks were non-verbal and reality-unknown so the demands of 
language and cognitive inhibition were low. If the association between the standard 
verbal reality-known false-representation tasks was replicated in this non-verbal 
reality-unknown context, it would suggest that language and cognitive inhibition did 
not play an important role in the association. Experiment 2 aimed to further replicate 
the association between the FB and FS tasks using both verbal and non-verbal tasks 
within one experiment; the standard verbal reality-known and non-verbal 
reality-unknown versions. Experiment 3 included children with ASD, in addition to 
typically developing children. Using the same tasks as Experiment 1, Experiment 3 
aimed to specify whether children with ASD have difficulties in understanding 
representations, independent of other cognitive deficits. Ethical approval was 
obtained from Department of Psychology University ethics committees and parental 
informed consent was obtained before testing. 
Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 provided the very first test of the novel non-verbal 
reality-unknown FS task, investigating how it worNHGUHODWLYHWR$SSHUO\HWDO¶V
(2004, 2007) FB and FP tasks in typically developing children aged 3 ± 7 years. As 
$SSHUO\HWDO¶VWDVNVKDYHnever been used with young typically developing children 
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in any published study, Experiment 1 also extended the applicability of their tasks.
1
 
,IFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKHVHnon-verbal reality-unknown tasks was similar to 
that of the standard verbal reality-unknown tasks, the associations previously found 
between the standard tasks would be replicated in this non-verbal reality-unknown 
context. This replication would suggest that the developmental factor that was 
shared between the FB, FS and FP tasks may not be the general cognitive skills of 
language and cognitive inhibition given that the demands of language and cognitive 
inhibition were greatly reduced in the non-verbal reality-unknown context.  
As the test trial of each task involved both representational understanding and 
incidental executive demands, it was essential to ensure that children could meet 
those incidental executive demands which were tested with two control trials. This 
assurance was achieved if FKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKHVHFRQWUROWULDOVZDV
significantly better than that on the test trials. Each task also contained two filler 
trials which demanded even less executive skills than the control trials. A relatively 
good performance on these filler trials would reflect that children had paid attention 
and had not been guessing throughout the tasks. Given that the correct answers for 
four of the five trials in each task required children to indicate the opposite box from 
the one indicated by the woman, photograph or signpost, children may have adopted 
an incorrect strategy of always pointing to the opposite box. To exclude this 
alternative explanation, performance on the true representation filler trial whose 
correct answer was the box indicated by the woman, photograph or signpost was 
examined.  
                                                 
1
 TKH\RXQJHVWPHDQDJHWKDW$SSHUO\HWDO¶V(2004) FB task has been established is 13 years 3 
months with a mean verbal mental age of 6 years 10 months in a sample of atypically developing 
children (including children with fragile X syndrome and intellectual disability; Grant, Apperly, & 
Oliver, 2007). Thus, children aged below 7 years and over 3 years were recruited. 
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Method 
Participants.  
In total, 20 children aged 41 ± 58 months (M = 49.90 months, SD = 5.95) and 
twenty children aged 60 ± 83 months (M = 71.65 months, SD = 7.75) were recruited 
from two schools in North East England and South East Wales.
2
 The sample had a 
mean verbal mental age (VMA) of 68.93 months (range = 39 ± 100 months; SD = 
16.30), which was calculated using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale - Second 
Edition (BPVS-II; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997). All children were White 
British except five who were from minority ethnic backgrounds. The populations of 
the schools were generally of low socio-economic status.  
Design.  
This was a mixed design, testing younger versus older children with the 
non-verbal reality-unknown FB, FP and FS tasks. Each of the three tasks consisted 
of one test trial, two control trials and two filler trials. Children were tested in three 
sessions at one- to two-week intervals. In each session, children were tested on all 
three tasks. The presentation order of the three tasks was counterbalanced across 
children and sessions whilst the order of the five trials within each task was 
randomised in each of the three sessions.  
Materials and procedure.  
Children were tested individually in a room within their own school by an 
experimenter. The tasks were video based and were presented on a laptop computer 
using PowerPoint software. The original FB and FP tasks were borrowed with kind 
permission from Apperly et al. (2004, 2007). As their FB and FP tasks were 
                                                 
2
 Half of the younger children and half of the older children were from each school and no 
VLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHLQFKLOGUHQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHZDVIRXQGEHWZHHQWKHVFKRROVps > .05) although 
they were from different regions of the United Kingdom. 
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originally designed for adults, several adaptations have been made to accommodate 
these tasks and the novel FS task in a single experiment for children. First, children 
were given short training video clips, each of which illustrated how a Polaroid 
camera or a signpost worked, at the beginning of the FP and FS tasks respectively. 
The training video for the FP task showed a man who pressed the button of a 
Polaroid camera in front of some flowers. A picture then came out of the camera 
which eventually developed to show an accurate image of the flowers (procedure 
adapted from Zaitchik, 1990). Figure 2 presents the event sequence of the training 
video of the FS task. As children by the age of 3 years already understand the 
relationship between seeing and knowing (e.g., Pratt & Bryant, 1990), no training 
was required for the FB task. Second, calls for attention (e.g., calling children by 
WKHLUQDPHVDQGHQFRXUDJLQJZRUGVHJ³:HOOGRQH´ZHUHused in each of the 
FB, FP and FS tasks. Third, a 2-minute break was given between each of the tasks. 
 Representational understanding in children  15 
 
Figure 2. Event sequence in the training of the novel false sign task. 
 
Before each task started, the principles of each task were explained verbally 
with still frames from the videoHJ³:HZLOOSOD\DKLGLQJ-and-finding game. Your 
job is to find a block. Look, the woman connects the sign. She puts its electric plug 
into the socket. Then she hides the block here. Now the sign turns to help you find 
WKHEORFN´Warm-up trials were then given (e.g., see Figure 3 for the FS task). In 
each task, a woman provided a clue for the children to locate the block. For the FB 
task, a woman placed a marker on top of the box she thought contained the block. 
For the FP task, a woman took a Polaroid photograph showing the interior of the two 
boxes. For the FS task, a woman revealed a signpost which automatically turned to 
show the location of the block. Corrective feedback (e.g³1RWKHEORFNLVLQWKHUH´) 
Training. (1) Signpost with an electric plug was not yet connected to electricity supply. 
(2) Signpost was connected to electricity supply by woman. (3) Object was put in one 
ER[DQGVLJQSRVWWXUQHGLQGLFDWLQJREMHFW¶VORFDWLRQ0HFKDQLFDOQRLVHZDVDOZD\V 
heard while signpost was turning. (4) Object was then moved to the other box and 
signpost turned accordingly (noise was heard). (5) Boxes were swapped with object 
inside one of them and signpost turned accordingly (noise was heard). 
1 2 3  
 (woman) 
(socket) (connected) 
 (object 
placed in) 
 
  (noise) 
4  (object 
moved to) 
5 
 (boxes swapped) 
 (object 
taken out) 
 Representational understanding in children  16 
was provided as necessary. Two consecutive correct responses in the warm-up phase 
were required from children before they entered the test phase of the relevant task. 
None of the children required more than four warm-up trials to achieve two 
consecutive correct responses. 
 
Figure 3. Event sequence of the warm-up trial of the novel false sign task. 
 
The test phase involved one false representation test trial, two control trials 
(working memory and response inhibition), and two filler trials (true representation 
and clue confirmation) in each of the three tasks (see Table 1 for the FS task; 
Appendix C and D for the FB and FP tasks). Neither the control nor filler trials 
required an understanding of representation. However, the control trials involved the 
same incidental demands of (1) holding in mind the events that happened in the video 
while working out the object¶s location (i.e., working memory) and (2) inhibiting the 
Warm-up trial. (1) Signpost was blocked from participant¶s view by screen but its electric 
plug was visible. (2) Signpost was connected to electricity supply. (3) Two boxes (one 
contained object) were placed on the sides of the screen and mechanical noise was heard. 
(4) Screen was removed and signpost was shown. (5) Screen was replaced and participant 
ZDVDVNHGWRLGHQWLI\REMHFW¶VORFDWLRQ. 
1 2 3 
  (screen) 
 (woman) 
(socket)    (noise) (connected) 
4 5 
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tendency of pointing to the box indicated (i.e., response inhibition) as the test trials. 
Feedback which showed the interior of the two boxes was always presented at the end 
of each trial after children had responded. Two more testing sessions followed the 
same procedure but without training and warm-up phases. Each task started with an 
explanation of its principle, followed by the test phase of the relevant task.  
 
Table 1 
Key Stages of the Test, Control and Filler Trials of the Novel False Sign Task 
False 
representation 
test trial 
Working 
memory 
control trial 
Response 
inhibition 
control trial 
True 
representation 
filler trial 
Clue 
confirmation 
filler trial 
A woman presented with an electrical signpost covered by a screen but its plug was 
visible. She put the plug into a socket. 
She placed two boxes on a table and the signpost turned with a mechanical noise 
behind a screen. The signpost indicating the location of an object was established.  
She took the 
plug out. 
The signpost 
was revealed 
and then 
covered. 
She took the plug out. The signpost 
was revealed 
and then 
covered. 
She swapped 
the boxes. 
She took the 
plug out. 
She took the 
object out of 
one box and 
put it into 
another box. 
She held the 
boxes up and 
down 
vertically. 
She took the 
plug out. 
The signpost 
was revealed 
and then 
covered. 
She swapped 
the boxes. 
The signpost was revealed and 
then covered.  
She took the 
object out of 
the box 
indicated by 
the signpost 
and put the 
object into 
another box. 
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Results 
Figure 4 shows the mean scores for the test and control trials of the three tasks. 
Older participants performed above chance on all the trials, ts(19) > 2.60, ps < .05, 
Cohen¶s ds > 1.19. However, younger participants performed below chance on the 
three test trials, ts(19) < -2.40, ps < .05, Cohen¶s ds > -1.10, but above chance on the 
control trials of all three tasks, ts(19) > 3.94, ps < .01, Cohen¶s ds > 1.81, except the 
working memory control trials of the FB and FS tasks on which they performed at 
chance level, ts(19) < .91, ps > .37.  
 
 
Figure 4. Mean Scores on Each Test and Control Trial Type of the False Belief, False 
Photograph and False Sign Tasks for Experiment 1. FR = False Representation Test 
Trial; RI = Response Inhibition Control Trial; WM = Working Memory Control Trial 
 
For both test trials and response inhibition control trials, 2 (age) X 3 (task) 
ANOVAs revealed main effects for age, Fs(1, 38) > 6.37, ps < .05, Șp2s > .14, but no 
effect for task and no interaction, Fs < 1.40, ps > .25. For the working memory 
control trials, there were significant main effects of age and task, F(1, 38) = 8.36, p 
< .01, Șp2 = .18 and F(2, 76) = 5.23, p < .01, Șp2 = .12 respectively, but no interaction, 
F(2, 76) = 1.25, p = .29. Performance on the working memory control trials of the 
FB and FS tasks was found to be worse than that of the FP task, p < .01 and p = .07 
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respectively, but no significant difference was found between the working memory 
control trials of the FB and FS tasks, p = 1. Table 2 showed significant differences 
between performance on the test trials, response inhibition control trials, and 
working memory control trials of the three tasks, suggesting that children could 
meet the incidental executive demands of the tasks. 
 
Table 2 
Repeated Measures ANOVAs and Post Hoc Tests Examining Performance 
Differences Between Test and Control Trials 
 F p Șp2 FR - RI FR - WM RI - WM 
False Belief 27.87 < .001 .42 p < .001 p < .05 p < .01 
False Sign 23.74 < .001 .38 p < .001 p < .05 p < .01 
False Photo 19.08 < .001 .33 p < .001 p < .001 p = 1 
Note. FR = False Representation Test Trial; RI = Response Inhibition Control Trial; 
WM = Working Memory Control Trial 
 
The test trials of the three tasks were highly correlated, rs(40) > .67, ps < .001. 
Each of the three test trials was also correlated with VMA, rs(40) > .36, ps < .05. 
Given that the three test trials were correlated with each other and each of them were 
correlated with VMA, the third test trial (e.g., the FS test trial) and VMA had to be 
controlled for in order to have a purer measure of the correlations between any two 
of the test trials (e.g., the FB and FP test trials). Table 3 showed the correlations 
between any two of the test trials.  
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Table 3 
Bivariate VMA-Controlled/Third-Task-Controlled Correlations and 
[VMA-and-Third-Task-Controlled Correlations] (With N) Between the False Belief, 
False Photograph and False Sign Tasks 
 False Belief False Photograph False Sign 
False Belief 
- .61***/.28 
(37) 
.71***/.55*** 
(37) 
False Photograph 
[.26] 
(35) 
- .66***/.42** 
(37) 
False Sign 
[.52**] 
(35) 
[.34*] 
(35) 
- 
Note. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05 
 
As feedback and encouraging words were provided, we also examined 
whether children improved performance on the test trials across the three sessions. 
Older participants did not improve on the FB and FS tasks, Ȥ2s(2, N = 20) < 3.82, ps 
> .24, but improved on the FP task, Ȥ2(2, N = 20) = 12.29, p < .01. Further analyses 
VKRZHGWKDWROGHUSDUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUIRUPDQFHRQWKH)3WDVNLPSURYHGIURP6HVVLRQ
to 2 and from Session 1 to 3, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.45, ps < .05, rs < -.39, but no 
improvement was shown from Session 2 to 3, Wilcoxon Z = -1, p = 1. Younger 
participants did not improve at all, Ȥ2s(2, N = 20) < 3.43, ps > .23. 
Ceiling effects were found for both clue confirmation (100% correct) and true 
representation filler trials (88.33 ± 95% correct) of all three tasks. Out of the 178 
correct responses to the test trials of all three tasks, there were only 15 which were 
paired with an incorrect response to the true representation filler trial in the same 
task. These results suggested that participants were not likely to be using the strategy 
of always pointing to the opposite box. 
Discussion 
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to assess whether the novel FS task is a 
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JRRGFRPSDULVRQWDVNWR$SSHUO\HWDO¶V, 2007) non-verbal FB and FP task, 
providing the very first test of the novel FS task. The results showed that with 
respect to incidental working memory demands, the FS task was more equivalent to 
the FB task compared to the FP task. Comparisons between the working memory 
and response inhibition control trials also reflected that the working memory 
demand was higher than the response inhibition demand in both of the FB and FS 
tasks but not in the FP task. These findings extend Sabbagh et al.¶s (2006) 
correlational findings. Instead of testing executive functioning with the bear/dragon 
task and correlating it with the FB, FS and FP tasks, the current experiment provided 
more solid evidence that executive functioning is incidentally required to a greater 
extent when reasoning about false beliefs and false signs than ³false´ photographs. 
Another difference between the tasks was that older participants significantly 
improved their performance on the false representation test trials of the FP task but 
not the FB and FS tasks across the three sessions, suggesting that the FP task was 
more subject to a practice effect for older participants. Despite these two differences, 
performance on the test trials of the tasks was not significantly different from but 
was correlated with each other. However, it is still worth noting that the correlation 
between the FB and FP tasks became non-significant when performance on the FS 
task and VMA were controlled. This finding replicated Leekam et al. (2008) who 
found similar results using standard verbal FB, FP and FS tasks.  
$OWKRXJKERWKRI$SSHUO\HWDO¶V(2004, 2007) tasks have not been used in 
such a young age range in any published study, the current study showed that their 
tasks and the novel FS task were able to reveal a developmental change of 
false-belief, false-sign and pictorial understandings: Children before the age of 5 
years performed below chance while those above 5 performed above chance. Call 
and Tomasello (1999) also found a similar developmental change in children below 
 Representational understanding in children  22 
versus above 5 years old. Given that the usual age when children pass the standard 
verbal reality-known FB and FP tasks in which the real location of an object was 
known by participants (e.g., it was visibly moved from location A to B; Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001; Zaitchik, 1990) was 4 years old, the non-verbal 
reality-unknown tasks appeared to be more difficult than the standard verbal 
reality-known ones. However, Call and Tomasello demonstrated that the two 
versions of the FB tasks were in fact comparable. Following Call and Tomasello¶s 
procedure, Experiment 2 tested children with the two versions of the FB and FS 
tasks in order to replicate the current findings and validate the novel FS task. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 compared a standard verbal reality-known version against the 
non-verbal reality-unknown version of the FB and FS tasks in a different group of 
typically developing children. The aim was twofold. First, to further replicate the 
associations found between the FB and FS tasks in both verbal and non-verbal 
versions within a single experiment. If a replication was illustrated, it would provide 
further evidence that language and cognitive inhibition do not play a role in the 
association between the two tasks. Second, the experiment aimed to validate the 
novel FS task against its standard version. If a validation was shown, it would 
suggest that the new FS task was virtually the same as the standard FS task but could 
further be employed to test populations who have language and cognitive inhibition 
problems such as children with ASD.  
In order to accomplish these two aims, Experiment 2 followed Call and 
7RPDVHOOR¶VGHVLJQRIDGPLQistering a standard version of the task in the 
context of the non-verbal reality-unknown version of the task series. Thus, the FB 
and FS tasks could be compared in both versions within a single experiment. Based 
on the findings of previous studies and of Experiment 1, no significant difference 
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but significant correlations were expected between the FB and FS tasks in across 
both versions. Further, given the previously reported association between the 
non-verbal and verbal versions of the FB task (Call & Tomasello, 1999), a similar 
finding was expected in the current experiment. However, it was unknown whether 
an association would be shown between the two versions of the FS task, given that 
this was the first time that this association was tested.  
Method 
Participants. 
In total, 13 children aged 39 ± 62 months (M = 52.69 months, SD = 7.54) and 
thirteen older children aged 63 ± 88 months (M = 78.38 months, SD = 8.93) were 
recruited from two schools in South East Wales. None of the children had taken part 
in Experiment 1. The sample had a mean VMA of 72.46 months (range = 37 ± 100 
months; SD = 17.62). All children were White British except four who were from 
minority ethnic backgrounds. The populations of the schools were generally of low 
socio-economic status.  
Design.  
This was a mixed design, testing younger versus older children with both 
versions of the FB and FS tasks. Children were tested with both versions of the tasks 
in each of three sessions at one-week intervals. Following the exact procedure of 
previous studies, the verbal version of the tasks consisted of a test question and a 
memory question; whereas the non-verbal version of the tasks consisted of the five 
trials as described in Experiment 1.  
Materials and procedure.  
The same non-verbal FB and FS tasks from Experiment 1 were used. The only 
difference between Experiment 1 and 2 was a verbal version of the tasks was added in 
the context of the non-verbal task series. For example, the verbal FB task was either 
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presented consecutively after the warm-up trials or after the series of the test, control 
and filler trials of the non-verbal FB task. In this way, the presentation order of the 
verbal and non-verbal versions of the tasks was counterbalanced across children.  
Following Call and Tomasello (1999), the verbal FB task was identical to the 
response inhibition control trial of the non-verbal FB task except that children were 
asked a test question, ³:KHUHGRHVWKHZRPDQWKLQNWKHEORFNLV"´, when the woman 
returned to the room. After children responded, they were asked a memory question, 
³:KHUHLVWKHEORFNUHDOO\"´ For the verbal FS task, children saw the woman 
presented with the signpost covered by a screen but its plug was visible. She put the 
plug in the socket and placed two boxes on the table. The mechanical noise 
produced by the turning signpost was heard. She then revealed the signpost, took the 
plug out, and displaced the object visibly from one box to the other. Children were 
asked a WHVWTXHVWLRQ³:KHUHGRHVWKHsign VKRZWKHEORFNLV"´DQGWKHsame 
memory question as above. Verbal IHHGEDFNZDVSURYLGHGHJ³1RWKHsign shows 
WKHEORFNLVLQWKLVER[´  
Results 
As previous studies using the standard verbal FB task considered participants 
as passers only if they passed both of the test and memory questions, the same 
criterion was employed for the current verbal FB and FS tasks. The mean scores for 
the tasks were shown in Figure 5. Performance on the control and filler trials of the 
non-verbal tasks was the same as that found in Experiment 1. We thus reported only 
the performance of the verbal tasks and the false representation test trials of the 
non-verbal tasks which was indeed the main focus of the current experiment. 
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Figure 5. Mean Scores on Each Test and Control Trial Type of the False Belief and 
False Sign Tasks for Experiment 2. FR = False Representation Test Trial; RI = 
Response Inhibition Control Trial; WM = Working Memory Control Trial 
 
Older children performed consistently above chance on both verbal and 
non-verbal FB and FS tasks, ts(12) > 2.82, ps < .05, Cohen¶s ds > 1.63. However, 
younger children performed below chance on the non-verbal ones, ts(12) < -2.21, ps 
< .05, Cohen¶s ds > -1.28, but at chance on the verbal ones, ts(12) > -1.37, ps > .20. 
A 2 (age) X 2 (version) X 2 (task) ANOVA revealed a main effect for age, F(1, 24) = 
22.81, p < .001, Șp2 = .49, but no effects for version and task, and no interactions, 
Fs(1, 24) < 2.13, ps > .16.  
VMA correlated significantly with both versions of the tasks, rs(26) > .60, ps 
< .01. Performance on the FB task correlated with that of the FS task, even after 
controlling for VMA, pr(23) = .74, p < .001 for the verbal version and pr(23) = .79, 
p < .001 for the non-verbal version. Significant correlations were also found 
between the verbal and non-verbal FB tasks, r(26) = .61, p < .001, and between the 
verbal and non-verbal FS tasks, r(26) = .58, p < .01. However, these correlations did 
not remain significant after controlling for VMA, prs(23) < .34, ps > .10. This 
finding seemed to be driven by the younger children. When we investigated the 
older children only, the correlations between the verbal and non-verbal tasks 
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remained significant after controlling for VMA, prs (10) > .60, ps < .05. Across the 
three sessions, no significant improvement was shown by both older and younger 
FKLOGUHQȤ2s(2, N = 13) < 5.20, ps > .17 for both non-verbal FB and FS tasks, and 
Ȥ2s(2, N = 13) < 6, ps > .07 for both verbal FB and FS tasks. Thus, FKLOGUHQ¶V
performance could not be explained by learning through feedback across sessions. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 replicated the finding of Experiment 1 that the equivalence 
between the FB and FS tasks holds in both verbal reality-known and non-verbal 
reality-unknown versions. Moreover, the new non-verbal FS task was validated by 
the findings that performance on the non-verbal FS task did not differ from that on 
the verbal FS task and that the two tasks were correlated (r = .58). It was not clear 
why the correlations between the verbal and non-verbal tasks remained significant 
for the older children only after controlling for VMA. However, it was reasonable 
that children reached certain VMA and started passing the verbal tasks as well as the 
non-verbal tasks and thus VMA explained most of the variance between the tasks for 
the younger children. Further investigation is needed to clarify this speculation. 
To our knowledge, none of the previous studies that have employed the same 
verbal and non-YHUEDO)%WDVNVKDYHPHDVXUHGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶90$&DOO	
Tomasello, 1999; Figueras-Costa & Harris, 2001) nor have they tested the 
correlations between the tasks after controlling for VMA. Given that previous 
studies have used the non-verbal FB task as a counterpart of the verbal FB task 
without measuring and controlling for VMA, we suggest that the new non-verbal FS 
task should still be appropriate for assessing false-sign understanding in children.  
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 investigated whether children with ASD have difficulties in 
understanding representations which could not be accounted for by their deficits in 
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language and executive function. The non-verbal reality-unknown FP task used in 
Experiment 1 was included in the current experiment for the following reasons. First, 
the inclusion of this FP task allowed an evaluation of whether children with ASD¶s 
performance on this FP task replicated that on the standard FP task. Second, if 
children with ASD performed relatively well on the non-verbal FP task, it would 
serve as a control task. Together with the control trials of the FB and FS tasks, a 
validation of equal executive abilities in meeting the incidental demands of the tasks 
between children with ASD and comparison children would be ensured. If children 
with and without ASD did not differ in their ability to meet the incidental demands 
of the tasks but significantly differed in their performance on the false representation 
test trials of the FB task only, it would clearly suggest that children with ASD suffer 
a specific impairment in understanding mental representations.  
Typically developing children were recruited as comparison children to match 
with children with ASD for the following reason. If an association between the FB 
and FS tasks was replicated in typically developing children and also found in 
children with ASD, it would suggest that children with ASD were no different from 
typically developing children in that both groups process mental and non-mental 
representations by means of an underlying conceptual capacity for representational 
understanding. On the contrary, if the association was found in typically developing 
children but not children with ASD because they performed selectively worse on the 
FB task than on the FP and FS tasks, it would provide evidence for a specific deficit 
in understanding mental representations in ASD. 
Method 
Participants.  
In total, 18 children with a diagnosis of ASD were recruited from two special 
schools and one resource unit of a primary school in South East Wales. All had a 
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community multidisciplinary team assessment leading to a best estimate clinical 
diagnosis of an ASD (including autism and Asperger syndrome) according to 
DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and ICD-10 (World Health 
Organisation, 1993) criteria. TRIXUWKHUDVVHVVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶$6'V\PSWRPVWKHLU
parents were requested to complete the lifetime version of the Social 
Communication Questionnaire (SCQ; Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) which has a 
cut-off point of 15 for ASD. All participants were justified to be included in the ASD 
group of the experiment (range of score: 15 ± 38; M = 26.50; SD = 6.34).  
A comparison group of 18 typically developing children were recruited from 
two schools in South East Wales. The ASD and comparison groups were matched in 
terms of VMA and non-verbal intelligence quotient (NVIQ), as measured with the 
BPVS-II and the Brief Intelligence Quotient composite of the Leiter International 
Performance Scale-Revised (Roid & Miller, 1997) respectively.
3
 Participant 
characteristics are presented in Table 4. The two groups did not differ in VMA, t(34) 
= -.35, p = .73, and NVIQ, t(27.98) = -1.50, p = .15, but differed in chronological 
age (CA), t(27.40) = 5.59, p < .001, Cohen¶s d = 2.14.4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Using VMA, there were 12 children who were matched exactly (same VMA score), 10 children 
who were matched within 5 months of age, and 14 children who could not be matched individually. 
With NVIQ, there were 10 children who were matched exactly (same NVIQ score), 14 children who 
were matched within 6 points of NVIQ (less than 0.50 SD), and 12 children who could not be 
matched individually. 
4
 The ASD group was older because 13 children with ASD above the age of the oldest typically 
developing children were included in order to match for VMA and NVIQ. 
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Table 4 
Characteristics of the Experimental and Comparison Groups  
Characteristic ASD (n = 18, 16 males)  Comparison (n = 18, 8 males) 
 M SD Range  M SD Range 
CA 104.89 19.95 70 - 133  74.44 11.66 52 - 88 
VMA 75.56 20.70 51 - 119  77.61 13.84 53 - 98 
NVIQ 97.89 19.93 65 - 133  106.11 12.06 91 - 135 
Note. ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder; CA = Chronological age in months; VMA 
= Verbal mental age in months; NVIQ = Non-verbal intelligence quotient 
 
Design, materials and procedure.  
This experiment used exactly the same design, materials and procedure as in 
Experiment 1, except that the between-participants factor was group (children with 
ASD versus typical development) rather than age. 
Results 
Performance on the control and filler trials of the three tasks was not 
significantly different between the two groups and was the same as that found in 
Experiment 1. This suggested that both groups were capable of meeting incidental 
cognitive demands of the tasks and that their capabilities were comparable even 
though they were not matched on CA. Moreover, both groups were not likely to be 
using the strategy of always pointing to the opposite box from the one indicated by 
the clues. To avoid redundancy, we report only children¶s performance on the false 
representation test trials of the three tasks which was indeed the main focus of the 
current experiment. 
Participants¶ mean scores for the tasks are presented in Figure 6. Children with 
$6'¶s performance on the FB and FS tasks was not significantly different from 
chance, t(17) = .65, p = .52 and t(17) = 1.46, p = .16 respectively. However, their 
performance on the FP task was significantly above chance, t(17) = 3.69, p < .01, 
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Cohen¶s d = 1.79. On the contrary, performance on all three tasks was significantly 
above chance for the comparison group, ts(17) > 6.76, ps < .001, Cohen¶s ds > 3.28. 
A 2 (group) X 3 (task) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of group and task, 
F(1, 34) = 9.30, p < .01, Șp2 = .21 and F(2, 68) = 3.12, p = .05, Șp2 = .08 respectively, 
but no significant interaction, F(2, 68) = 2.43, p = .10. Performance on the FP task 
was marginally better than that on the FB task, p = .06; whereas performance on the 
FS task did not differ from those on the FB and FP tasks, p = .57 and p = .70 
respectively. Planned contrasts revealed that the groups were different on the FB and 
FS tasks, t(34) = -3.11, p < .01, Cohen¶s d = -1.07 and t(34) = -2.79, p < .01, 
Cohen¶s d = -0.96 respectively, but not on the FP task, t(34) = -1.62, p = .11. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean Scores on Each Test and Control Trial Type of the False Belief, 
False Photograph and False Sign Tasks for Experiment 3. FR = False Representation 
Test Trial; RI = Response Inhibition Control Trial; WM = Working Memory Control 
Trial; ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
The test trials of the three tasks was correlated with VMA, rs(36) > .38, ps 
< .05, but not with NVIQ, rs(36) < .30, ps > .05. When VMA was controlled, the 
correlations between the test trials on the three tasks remained significant, prs(33) 
> .47, ps < .01. Looking at the groups separately, performance on the three tasks was 
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also significantly correlated, rs (18) > .50, ps < .05 for the ASD group and rs (18) 
> .46, ps < .05 for the comparison group. However, only the correlation between the 
FB and FS tasks remained significant when performance on the third task (i.e., the 
FP task in this case) was controlled, pr(15) = .58, p < .05 for the ASD group and 
pr(15) = .48, p < .05 for the comparison group.  
Children with ASD improved their performance across the three sessions on 
the FB task, Ȥ2(2, N = 18) = 10.89, p < .01, the FP task, Ȥ2(2, N = 18) = 7.75, p < .05, 
and the FS task, Ȥ2(2, N = 18) = 10.75, p < .01. Improvement was significant only 
from Session 1 to 2 and 3 on the FB and FS tasks, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.45, ps < .05, rs 
< -.41, but marginal on the FP task, Wilcoxon Zs < -2.12, ps = .07 and .06, rs < -.35. 
On the contrary, typically developing children did not improve their performance on 
WKH)%DQG)6WDVNVDFURVVWKHWKUHHVHVVLRQVȤ2(2, N = 18) = 2.80, p  DQGȤ2(2, 
N = 18) = 6.50, p  UHVSHFWLYHO\EXWLPSURYHGRQWKH)3WDVNȤ2(2, N = 18) = 12, 
p < .01. Improvement on the FP task was significant from Session 1 to 2 and 3 only, 
Wilcoxon Zs = -2.45, ps = .05, rs < -.41.  
Discussion 
Experiment 3 investigated whether children with ASD have difficulties in 
understanding representations, independent of other impairments in language and 
executive function. Results showed that children with ASD performed worse on the 
false representation test trials of the FB and FS tasks relative to typically developing 
children. When performance on the FP task was partialled out, the association 
between the FB and FS tasks remained. Together with their good performance on the 
control trials of the tasks, these findings suggest that children with ASD were neither 
selectively impaired in understanding mental representations, nor primarily impaired 
in language and executive function which mask their competence of understanding 
mental and non-mental representations.  
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Children with ASD performed as well as typically developing children on the 
FP task, supporting previous findings using the standard verbal FP task (e.g., 
Leekam & Perner, 1991). However, children with ASD have also been shown to fail 
a modified FP task (Russell, Saltmarsh, & Hill, 1999). If all the FP tasks involved 
only true representations, why did children with ASD succeed on some of them but 
not all of them? It is possible that children with ASD failed Russell et al.¶s (1999) FP 
task because of its higher executive demands and its unnatural nature of taking a 
photograph of a screen rather than a person or an object, as Russell et al. has 
suggested. By having no object in the photograph, the photograph became less 
salient and thus harder to resist the interference from reality which was not the same 
as what was shown on the photograph.  
General Discussion 
The current study introduced a newly devised non-verbal FS task to test 
whether the non-specificity claim of theory of mind still holds in a non-verbal and 
reality-unknown context in both children with and without ASD. Experiment 1 and 2 
showed that the non-verbal reality-unknown and verbal reality-known forms of the 
FS task showed equivalence across both forms of the FB task. Experiment 3 showed 
that children with ASD had consistent difficulties with the non-verbal 
reality-unknown forms of the false representation tasks. As a whole, the current 
findings suggested that the consistent performance by children with and without 
ASD may not be explained by the shared demands on language and cognitive 
inhibition between the tasks. It may better be explained in terms of an underlying 
conceptual capacity of understanding false representations, providing further 
evidence against the domain-specificity account of µtheory of mind¶.  
Testing Representational Understanding With Minimal Demands on Other 
Cognitive Skills 
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One advantage of the non-verbal reality-unknown tasks used in the current 
study was that these tasks do not require sophisticated language and cognitive 
inhibition skills in their assessment of FKLOGUHQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ. In 
this respect it is similar to the demands of other non-verbal tasks used in previous 
studies, which measured young children and infants¶ spontaneous looking 
behaviours while they were observing false-belief situations (e.g., Onishi & 
Baillargeon, 2005; Southgate, Senju, & Csibra, 2007). For example, Senju et al. 
(2009, 2010) employed Southgate et al.¶s paradigm (2007) to test spontaneous 
anticipatory looking in individuals with ASD based on the protagonist¶V false belief. 
Results showed that individuals with ASD failed to show correct action anticipatory 
looking that would be LQOLQHZLWKWKHSURWDJRQLVW¶VIDOVHEHOLHI+RZHYHUORRNLQJ
behaviours are ambiguous and alternative explanations are possible. For example, 
the lack of spontaneous anticipatory looking in individuals with ASD may be 
generally directed to social stimuli (Ruffman, Garnham, & Rideout, 2001) rather 
than specifically directed to false-belief attribution. Moreover, the correct 
anticipatory looking shown by typically developing individuals in the control groups 
could be explained by behaviour rules such as people look for objects where they 
last saw them (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman & Perner, 2005). More 
importantly, Schneider, Lam, Bayliss and Dux (2012) recently highlighted that even 
implicit belief processing measured with looking behaviours requires executive 
resources and is affected by extra cognitive load. Therefore, these paradigms did not 
necessarily provide evidence that a false belief was attributed or genuinely 
understood with least demands on executive skills. 
One might ask whether children¶s success on the FB and FS tasks in the 
current study could also be explained by behaviour rules (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 
2005). We suggested that this was not likely the case for the following reasons. First, 
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the elements in the tasks of the current study were either rare (e.g., woman placed 
marker) or novel (e.g., electrical signpost) for children. Second, there was no 
evidence that children have learnt from the tasks and improved their performance 
across sessions in both Experiment 1 and 2. Although children with ASD 
(Experiment 3) did show improvement across sessions, they did not perform the 
tasks well overall. It was thus unlikely that children with and without ASD had 
picked up any rules from their everyday life or from the tasks per se that might have 
helped them pass the tasks.  
Theory of Mind, False Belief and Domain Specificity  
False-belief understanding has been considered as a crucial aspect of µtheory of 
mind¶ which is widely suggested to be a domain-specific mechanism dedicated to 
mental-related information processing only (e.g., Leslie et al., 2004). Moreover, 
individuals with ASD have been universally suggested to be specifically impaired in 
µtheory of mind¶ since Baron-Cohen et al. (1985; Senju et al., 2009, 2010). Cohen 
and German (2010) also recently VKRZHGWKDWDGXOWV¶UHDFWLRQWLPHVWRIDOVH-belief 
situations were faster than to false-map and false-sign situations, claiming that a 
domain-specific µtheory of mind¶ exists in human cognition. In the study, 
participants saw an actress hide an object and draw a map/arrow to indicate the 
REMHFW¶VORFDWLRQ before leaving (but participants could not see the map/arrow). 
Participants then saw a man either move the object or leave it in place. Subsequently, 
an unpredictable test probe appearedHLWKHUVD\LQJ³6KHWKLQNVWKDWWKHSXUVHLVLQ
WKHULJKWGUDZHU´(false-belief condition) RU³7KHPDSDUURZVKRZVWKDWWKHSXUVHLV
in the righWGUDZHU´(false-map condition/false-sign condition). Participants had to 
PDNHD³\HVQR´UHVSRQVHWRWKHSUREHDQGWKHLUUHDFWLRQWLPHVZHUHPHDVXUHG 
Given the map/arrow was drawn by the actress and was not shown to participants, 
we suggest that participants might have to first process what the actress believed in 
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order to work out what she had drawn when they had to respond to the latter probe. 
This may lead to the longer reaction times found for the false-map/false-sign 
condition relative to the false-belief condition. If that was the case, then Cohen and 
German¶s results did not necessarily support the domain-specific claim of µtheory of 
mind¶.  
Similarly, one might argue that the non-verbal FS task in the current study may 
elicit mentalizing of the actress who intentionally manipulated the signpost¶s 
connection to electricity. However, this was not a necessary process for participants 
to figure out the object¶s location. An analogy is an electrical clock after a power-cut 
situation. One knows that the time shown on the clock falsely represents the current 
time as an earlier time without mentalizing of anyone who has possibly caused the 
power-cut. If participants with ASD failed the false representation trial of the task 
because they failed to mentalize, they would also have failed the control and filler 
trials of the task which involved the same actress performing the same sets of 
actions. Moreover, we made sure that every participant, with or without ASD, 
understood how the electrical signpost worked and that they could track the actions 
of the actress through the training phase, the warm-up trials, the control trials and 
the filler trials. It was therefore not possible that the participants with ASD failed the 
task because they failed to track the actress¶s actions. 
Another theoretical concern about the claim against domain-specificity of 
µtheory of mind¶ is that a sign may arguably involve a mental component in its 
interpretation as it is intended by someone to be a felicitous communicative vehicle 
although it is physically non-mental. However, we argue that this concern cannot 
explain the asymmetries in associations between the FP versus FS and FB tasks 
found in the current study based on the nature of Apperly et al.¶s FP task (2007). In 
this task, the protagonist showed children the photograph which served as a clue for 
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them to find the object. Hence, the photograph here may also involve an intentional 
communicative component. This may be a reason why the raw correlations between 
the three tasks were significant in both Experiment 1 and 3. However, partial 
correlations between the FB and FP tasks were not significant but those between the 
FB and FS tasks were significant in both children with and without ASD. Thus, the 
falseness of representations which taps a genuine understanding of representation 
should be the core determinant of the equivalence between the tasks.  
Indeed, µtheory of mind¶ is an umbrella concept which comprises processing of 
all types of inner, mental and emotional states. False-belief understanding involves 
not only mental but also representational characteristics so it should be regarded as a 
separate aspect of µtheory of mind¶ (e.g., Iao et al., 2011; Leekam et al., 2008). This 
separate aspect of µtheory of mind¶ FDQEHVSHFLILHGDV³representational theory of 
PLQG´ZKLFKLVGLVWLQJXLVKHGIURP³non-representational WKHRU\RIPLQG´E\WKH
requirement to interpret a mental state as a representation. Although individuals with 
ASD are widely found to show poor performance on the FB task (for meta-analyses, 
see Happé, 1995; Yirimiya et al., 1998), this difficulty in ASD seems not to apply to 
every task concerning mental states. There is evidence that mental states which do 
QRWUHTXLUHD³representational WKHRU\RIPLQG´DUHQRWDVGLIILFXOWas false beliefs 
for individuals with ASD. For example, their level 1 visual perspective-taking is 
intact (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1989), and their understanding of simple emotions is not 
worse than that of other mentally retarded populations (see Begeer, Koot, Rieffe, 
Meerum Terwogt, & Stegge, 2008, for a review). Moreover, children with ASD are 
capable of understanding goals and intentions (see Hamilton, 2009, for a review). 
ThusLQGLYLGXDOVZLWK$6'PD\QRWEHDVLPSDLUHGLQ³non-representational theory 
of mLQG´DVWKH\DUHLQ³representational WKHRU\RIPLQG´  
To conclude, the current study was the first to show that the association 
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between tasks testing false beliefs and false signs was not due to their shared 
demands on language and executive function in both children with and without ASD. 
Rather, representational understanding is probably the key concept that underpins 
the processing of both mental and non-mental representations, providing further 
evidence for the non-specificity claim of µtheory of mind¶. Last but not least, the 
new non-verbal reality-unknown FS task opens further research opportunity for 
investigating atypical populations who have cognitive difficulties and the human 
brain functions. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Key Stages of the Test Trials of False Belief, False Photograph and False Sign Tasks 
False belief (Apperly et 
al., 2004) 
False photograph (Apperly 
et al., 2007) 
False sign (novel) 
A man and a woman 
appeared.  
 A woman appeared with 
an electrical signpost 
covered by a screen but its 
plug was visible. She put 
the plug into a socket. 
The man placed two boxes 
(one contained an object) 
on a table by the two sides 
of a marker and showed 
the interior of the boxes to 
the woman.  
A man placed two boxes 
(one contained an object) 
on a table. A woman took a 
SKRWRJUDSKRIWKHER[HV¶
interior and placed it 
face-down on the table.  
The woman placed two 
boxes (one contained an 
object) on a table by the 
two sides of the screen. A 
mechanical noise was 
heard.  
The woman left the room 
(so she was not able to 
update her belief about the 
location of the object). 
 The woman took the plug 
out (so the signpost was 
not able to update its 
LQGLFDWLRQRIWKHREMHFW¶V
location). 
The man swapped the 
boxes. 
The man swapped the 
boxes. 
The woman swapped the 
boxes. 
7KHZRPDQ¶VEHOLHIZDV
manifested when she 
placed the marker on one 
of the boxes. 
The photograph was 
shown when the man 
turned it over. 
The signpost was revealed 
when the woman took the 
screen off. 
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Appendix B 
Analogy Between the Components Involved in the False Belief and False Sign Tasks 
False belief (Apperly et al., 2004)  False sign (novel) 
Man  
(hiding object and showing to woman) 
 
 Woman  
(hiding object and enabling signpost) 
:RPDQ¶VSUHVHQFH 
 
 Signpost being plugged in 
Marker placed between boxes  
QRLQGLFDWLRQRIREMHFW¶VORFDWLRQ 
 
 Screen 
Woman viewing inside the boxes 
 
 6LJQSRVW¶VWXUQLQJ  
(suggested by a mechanical noise) 
 
:RPDQ¶VDEVHQFH  Signpost being unplugged 
 
False belief being manifested by 
placing marker 
 False sign being revealed by removing 
screen 
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Appendix C 
Key Stages of the Test, Control and Filler Trials of the False Belief Task (Apperly et 
al., 2004) 
False 
representation 
test trial 
Working 
memory 
control trial 
Response 
inhibition 
control trial 
True 
representation 
filler trial 
Clue 
confirmation 
filler trial 
A man and a woman presented. 
The man placed two boxes (one contained an object) on a table by the two sides of a 
marker and showed the interior of the boxes to the woman.  
The woman 
left the room. 
The woman 
placed the 
marker on one 
box and put it 
back on table. 
The woman left the room. The woman 
placed the 
marker on one 
box and put it 
back on table 
The man 
swapped the 
boxes. 
The woman 
left the room. 
The man took 
the object out 
of one box and 
put it into 
another box. 
The man held 
the boxes up 
and down 
vertically. 
The woman 
left the room. 
The woman 
returned, 
placed the 
marker on one 
box and put it 
back on table.  
The man 
swapped the 
boxes. 
The woman returned, placed the 
marker on one box and put it 
back on table. 
The man took 
the object out 
of the box 
indicated by 
the woman and 
put it into 
another box. 
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Appendix D 
Key Stages of the Test, Control and Filler Trials of the False Photograph Task 
(Apperly et al., 2007) 
False 
representation 
test trial 
Working 
memory 
control trial 
Response 
inhibition 
control trial 
True 
representation 
filler trial 
Clue 
confirmation 
filler trial 
A man placed two boxes (one contained an object) on a table. A woman took a 
SKRWRJUDSKRIWKHER[HV¶LQWHULRUDQGSODFHGLWIDFH-down on the table. Then she left. 
The man 
swapped the 
boxes. 
The man 
revealed the 
photograph 
and then 
covered it. 
The man took 
the object out 
of one box and 
put it into 
another box. 
The man held 
the boxes up 
and down 
vertically. 
The man 
revealed the 
photograph 
and then 
covered it. 
He revealed 
the photograph 
and then 
covered it. 
He swapped 
the boxes. 
He revealed the photograph and 
then covered it. 
He took the 
object out of 
the box 
indicated by 
the photograph 
and put it into 
another box. 
 
 
